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a
lAbstract
We study the entry into legitimate employment and earnings of a large sample of
convicts released from Hungarian prisons in 2002–08. The employment rate of the
prisoners falls short of 20% one year before incarceration, and they earn 25% below
the national average. We identify the effect of prison by exploiting differences in the
timing of incarceration and also by estimating fixed-effect models. For convicts with
a single prison term, we find an initially negative effect on employment, which turns
positive after a year, though the impact on earnings is permanently negative. A
comparison with recidivists suggests that these results are driven by a drop in the
reservation wages of ‘reformed’ criminals. This reading is supported by further data
showing that the average ex-inmate tends to make increased efforts to find a
legitimate source of livelihood and support in job search.
Keywords: Incarceration; Prison effects; Unemployment; Wage loss; Discrimination
JEL Classification: K42; J64; J391 Introduction
The effects of prison on employment and wages are theoretically unpredictable. A spell
in prison brings with it a stigma and often leads to the loss of personal networks, with
corresponding adverse consequences for finding a job and (predictably less so) for
earnings. Detention impels convicts into a social environment that tempts them into
further crime and keeps their labor supply low. At the same time, the experience of
prison may deter offenders from committing further crimes, lower their reservation
wages, and so improve their chances of getting a job. Lengthy incarceration implies a loss
of work experience, and therefore lower wages. The reduced wages on offer may–at
least temporarily–decrease the exit-to-job rate of ex-inmates, depending on how rapidly
they adjust their reservation wages. Work in prison, training, and support services may
simultaneously improve convicts’ employability and earning potential. Since the relative
strength of these effects varies with the institutional environment, social norms, labor
market regulations, and prison practices, the net outcomes may differ substantially across
countries and periods, and require empirical investigation. (See Western et al. 2001;
Fahey et al. 2006; Geller et al. 2006; Holzer et al. 2003; and Holzer 2007 for comprehen-
sive overviews of the above mentioned effects).
However, the effects of prison on subsequent labor market careers are difficult to iden-
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simultaneously predict criminal behavior and meager labor market outcomes. Models
comparing released prisoners with observationally similar non-convicts can only estimate
what Bound and Freeman (1992) label a ‘crime–employment trade-off ’, rather than a
causal effect. Such models indicate severe disadvantages on the part of ex-prisoners, but
this might, at least partly, exist even without incarceration (Bound and Freeman 1992;
Freeman 1991; Freeman 1996; and Grogger, 1995).
The scope for randomizing the event of incarceration by means of matching methods
is limited, even in surveys that provide detailed portraits of the offenders. In research
based on official population registers, any attempt to find people with a ‘similar probabil-
ity of being incarcerated’ would be purely formal.1 Finding instruments that affect the
incidence or length of a prison term without affecting labor market prospects is also
easier said than done.2 Therefore, the register-based studies typically stay within the
boundaries of the offender population and try to find alternative means of identification.
One way to deal with the problem is to collect data from the period preceding incar-
ceration and to control for individual fixed effects in panel regressions that compare
labor market outcomes before and after incarceration. While the fixed effects help to
account for time-invariant unobserved characteristics, the model has the shortcoming
that it treats pre-prison outcomes as the counterfactual for post-prison outcomes–an
assumption that may or may not be valid in a changing economic environment and
after a number of years spent in custody. Several studies try to overcome this problem
by comparing the post-release experience of ex-convicts with the pre-prison experience
of observationally similar future convicts, while controlling for calendar time. In this
case, the pre-prison experience of the future inmates serves as the counterfactual situ-
ation on the assumption that the early and late cohorts are similar in terms of unob-
served individual and contextual attributes. Widely cited examples are Grogger (1995),
Western (2002), Raphael (2007) and LaLonde and Cho (2008).
Our benchmark model follows these studies in comparing the post-prison employment
of ex-convicts with the pre-prison careers of offenders incarcerated later. For offenders
with a single spell of prison in 2002–08, we find initially negative effects on both wages
and employment. While the wage effect is strong and remains negative throughout the
observed post-prison period, the employment effect fades rapidly and turns positive after
a year out of prison. Fixed-effects models comparing the pre-prison and post-prison ex-
perience of inmates yield similar results, as do the model variants that reduce the poten-
tial bias from unobserved recidivism. It is important to note, however, that the legitimate
employment rate of the ex-convicts remains very low: less than 25% even after 7 years
spent continuously out of prison.
In interpreting this pair of findings, one should take into account the fact that the es-
timates inseparably capture negative and positive effects. Statistical discrimination tends
to decrease both employment and wages, while giving up criminal activity is conducive
to lower wages and higher employment. Therefore, the finding of a weak employment ef-
fect combined with a strong negative wage effect comes as no surprise in an environment
where other effects (such as the loss of experience and improving marketability thanks to
support services) are relatively weak. Indeed, most studies that apply such methods find a
negative effect on wages, while the effects on employment are ambiguous and tend to be
weak, or even positive in some of the more recent papers (see Needles 1996; Western and
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2009, and overviews in Western et al. 2001; Geller et al. 2006; and Holzer 2007).
We try to separate the effects of discrimination and withdrawal from crime by looking
at recidivists who continue committing crimes between two prison spells. For these pe-
riods, when the stigma of a criminal record is present, but the reservation wage effect is
absent, we identify a significant negative impact on employment and only a minor decline
in earnings. By contrast, the results for the period after the last observed prison spells of
repeat offenders are similar to those of non-recidivists.
Our reading of the findings is valid on the assumption that amoral economic consid-
erations play an important role in shaping the labor supply of ex-inmates, once they
have decided to abandon crime on moral grounds, because of the deterrent effect of
prison or for long-run utility considerations. We can assume that, among people
imprisoned for economic crime (60% in Hungary, according to CSO 2008: 52), a per-
manent shift away from delinquency strongly affects labor market behavior. In cases
where crime generates income without consuming a significant amount of time, the ef-
fect of ‘reform’ is analogous to the impact of a reduction in non-wage income. If crime
is time consuming and has diminishing returns, it can be thought of as a kind of ‘house-
hold production’, extended to the point where its marginal product equals the market
wage. (See Grogger, 1998 for this line of reasoning, with reference to the seminal model of
Gronau, 1977.) The implications of ‘reform’ are similar in a standard job-search frame-
work: a fall in non-wage income is conducive to lower reservation wages and a higher
probability of accepting a given wage offer. Discrimination furthermore reduces the job
offer arrival rate, makes extended job search less attractive, and drags the mean of ac-
cepted wage offers downward.
Falling reservation wages imply further observable outcomes. If the labor supply of
released prisoners increases while firms are reluctant to hire them, we should observe a
rise in search intensity among the non-employed ex-inmates. The data on registration
at labor offices and on the receipt of public transfers support that ex-inmates tend to
invest increased effort in finding a legitimate source of livelihood.
The research behind this paper was motivated by Hungary’s growing incarceration rate,
which is among the highest in Europe (bar the ex-Soviet states), with 180 prisoners per
100,000 inhabitants in 2013. The growing rigor of sentencing and the introduction of a
‘Three Strikes Law’ in 2010 leave no doubt that the risk of incarceration will increase further
in the foreseeable future.3 Despite the growing importance of the problem, we know virtu-
ally nothing, in quantitative terms, about the labor market experience of inmates. Only a
few interview-based studies (Tóth 2005; Csáki et al. 2007; Csáki and Mészáros 2011) report
quantitative results on small samples comprising a few dozen ex-convicts. The findings also
add to the thin European literature on the aftermaths of incarceration. The effects of prison
service have been extensively studied in the US, which has the largest per capita prison
population in the world (over 700 per 100,000 inhabitants), but very infrequently in Europe
and elsewhere. Nagin and Waldfogel (1995) on Britain, Skardhamar and Telle (2009) on
Norway, and Drago et al. (2009) on Italy are three of the few European exceptions.
2 Data
The data set collects information from registers of the Pension Directorate, the Health
Insurance Fund, the Treasury, and the Public Employment Service. The original sample
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2002. Each person in the sample is followed from January 2002 until December 2008
(or exit from the social security registers for reasons of death or out-migration). The
data show the labor market and prison status of about 4 million individuals on the
15th day of each month, their days in work during the month, and their income from
employment and/or self-employment. We also have data on registration at a labor
office and the receipt of such transfers as unemployment insurance benefit (UI), un-
employment assistance (UA), old-age pension, disability payment, childcare allow-
ance, and social benefits. The data on transfers are available from 2004 onwards.
Those incarcerated can be identified because the state pays their social security
contributions to the Health Insurance Fund. In our period of observation, on average
73% of those incarcerated were in prison, 25% were in pre-trial custody (also typic-
ally prison), and 2% were in some other type of detention (calculated using data in
CSO, 2013). In the data that we have at our disposal, we cannot distinguish between
the three groups. However, we can check how the implications of short spells behind
bars differ from the consequences of longer sentences, i.e., after excluding cases of
pre-trial detention without a subsequent prison term.
Our subjects are regarded as employed if their employer or own business reported
non-zero personal income to the Pension Fund in a given month. Alternatively, we use
an employment dummy (set to 1 if the person was employed on the 15th day of the
month) and the number of days in work during the month. The wage figure is pre-tax
and relates to monthly earnings from all jobs and businesses attended/operated by the
person observed. Daily earnings are calculated using information on monthly income
and days in work. The file at our disposal records the incidence but not the amount of
transfers.
Even if they work, prisoners are treated as a special category, distinct from other
wage earners. Working prisoners are paid one-third of the previous year’s minimum
wage, an amount less than one-ninth of the average wage. We treat prisoners as non-
employed, earning zero wages.
We know the age, gender and occupation of the individuals, and also have informa-
tion on the type of the employment relationship: employees versus public employees
and civil servants, self-employed and two other categories of marginal importance.
The starting sample covers 30,835 people aged 16–74 in 2002 and incarcerated at
least once in 2002–08. We exclude people who died before December 2008, inmates in
prison throughout the observed period, and persons with incomplete payment records,
indicating the start date but not the end date of incarceration. These restrictions reduce
the sample size from the original 30,835 to 26,877.
Four distinct groups can be identified in the seven-year window through which we ob-
serve the incarceration, time in detention, and release of prisoners (Table 1). About one-
third of the spells in prison are censored from left or right, and slightly less than half of
them are uncensored (i.e., started after January 2002 and ended before December 2008).
The completed duration of incarceration in the case of uncensored spells was 13.4 months
on average. About a fifth of those incarcerated at least once had further spells in prison after
being released on completion of their first term. 4
Since our data follow the stock of people aged 16–74 in 2002, it excludes more and
more young prisoners as we move towards 2008. In our benchmark specification, we
Table 1 Number of observations by spells in prison in the cleaned sample (2002–08)
Persons Person-months
Single left-censored spell in prison 6272 521,164
Single right-censored spell in prison 2061 169,965
Single uncensored spell in prison 13,681 947,642
More than one prison spell in the observed period (recidivists) 4863 408,009
Total incarcerated at least once in 2002–08 26,877 2,046,780
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of robustness checks. Statistics on the estimation sample are presented in Appendix.
Our data have several advantages and disadvantages compared to the administrative
panels used in the US, which are typically created by merging data from the prison ad-
ministration and the state-level UI registers. Compared to the US databases, our data
tell us very little about the personal characteristics of the offenders. At the same time,
the Hungarian data provide a more detailed view of labor market careers, as they
contain information on occupations, employment relationships, transfer receipt and
registration at a labor office. While the American state-level UI registers exclude
public-sector employees, the self-employed and people who work in other states
(Holzer 2007), the Hungarian Pension Directorate’s register records all legitimate
employment spells, irrespective of sector, ownership, and region.
Alongside a host of apparent disadvantages, the administrative registers have certain
advantages over survey data. Former inmates are difficult to find, hard to persuade to
participate in a survey, and their answers can be biased. Even more importantly, in an
interview-based survey, it is practically impossible to reconstruct the offenders’ employ-
ment and wage paths with acceptable precision. Lack of information on informal em-
ployment and earnings is the major drawback of administrative data. We shall discuss
the implications this has for this paper in Section 8.
3 Estimation methods
3.1 Exploiting variations in the timing of incarceration
In our benchmark model, we follow LaLonde and Cho (2008) in comparing the post-
prison records of released prisoners to the pre-prison records of similar prisoners in-
carcerated later. The estimated model is a random-effects panel regression,
yit ¼ αXit þ δZi þ
X28
q¼−4
βqQq þ
X84
t¼2
γtT t þ uit ; ð1Þ
where yit stands for the outcome variable (days in work, daily earnings) for person i in
month t, Xit and Zi are time-variant and time-invariant covariates, Tt is a dummy vari-
able equal to 1 in month t and 0 otherwise, while uit is a residual term. The Qq dum-
mies denote relative time–set to 1 if person i is q quarters away from any quarters
spent in prison, either partly or entirely. Thus for any quarter containing time in
prison, q is set to 0. Q0 = 1 covers the quarters of incarceration, prison and release;
Q1 = 1 stands for the first full quarter after release; and so on.
The βq coefficients measure the effect of relative time on the outcome variable, con-
ditional on the X and Z characteristics and keeping calendar time constant. The
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year. A coefficient of β6 = −0.1, for instance, would suggest that the outcome variable is
estimated to be 10 percentage points lower for those in their sixth full quarter after re-
lease than for offenders more than one year before their incarceration.5
Several caveats apply to the overlapping cohorts model of equation (1).
First, the strong correlation between calendar time and relative time means there is a
risk of invalid results about individual predictors, including relative time effects. This is
particularly the case on the margins of the observation window: the 25th post-prison
quarter, for instance, can only occur in 2008, and the same problem arises when a pre-
prison quarter substantially precedes the date of incarceration. In order to reduce the
risks arising from multicollinearity, one should either widen the brackets of relative
time or narrow the time window to a range where there is sufficient variation of calen-
dar time at a given level of relative time. Our experiments suggest that this range is lo-
cated at |q| < 11, where the correlation between calendar months and relative quarters
is 0.32, as opposed to 0.63 in the whole sample, and 0.91 if |q| ≥ 11.6 To check whether
multicollinearity is a problem, we repeat the estimation after narrowing the time win-
dow to 10 quarters before and after time in prison.
Second, this specification cannot deal with offenders who served several prison
sentences in the period observed. Recidivists q quarters after a prison spell can also
be q + x quarters after another prison spell, and several quarters before their next
spell, and so we cannot define a relative time variable for them in the way we do for
non-recidivists. Therefore, we estimate equation (1) for offenders with a single
prison spell and include recidivists in another model introduced in Section 4.4.
Third, it should be taken into consideration that the relative quarter dummies re-
late to populations of different size. We have plenty of observations at the level of yit
one quarter before or after prison, but the data for the -27th or 27th quarters come
exclusively from cohorts incarcerated in 2008 Q3 or released in 2002 Q2, respect-
ively. Therefore, it is important to assess how the time path of the overall average
(constructed from the means of yit across all cohorts observed in t) relates to the
time paths followed by the individual cohorts.7
Last but not least, estimating a random-effects equation is tantamount to assuming
that the residual is uncorrelated with unobserved individual attributes affecting the out-
come. With only a few control variables to hand, the risk of such correlation is high,
and there is a strong case for estimating fixed-effects models.3.2 Fixed-effects estimates
Estimating equation (1) by simply allowing for individual fixed effects is infeasible,
because calendar time and relative time are very strongly correlated within personal
histories. (If we had relative month dummies instead of quarter dummies, the correl-
ation would be perfect by construction for persons serving only one month in
prison.) Therefore, we set fairly wide brackets for relative time: 1–8 quarters and
more than eight quarters before/after the prison quarters. In equation (2), these pe-
riods are labelled ‘shortly before’, ‘long before’, ‘shortly after’ and ‘long after’. The re-
sidual uit is decomposed to an individual fixed effect (ci) and a residual term (εit)
assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors.
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þ
X7
t¼2
γtT t þ ci þ εit
ð2Þ
The model compares post-prison outcomes to the same person’s pre-prison out-comes: a coefficient of β3 = −0.1, for instance, would mean that the outcome variable is
10 percentage points lower in the first eight quarters after release than it was more
than eight quarters prior to incarceration.
3.3 Taking care of unobserved recidivism
In the case of offenders incarcerated before the period of observation, ‘pre-prison’ em-
ployment and wages bear the effect of previous prison experience–and this leads to
an underestimation of the negative consequences of incarceration (Holzer 2007). Due
to a lack of information on the previous criminal records of offenders, one has to fall
back on second-best solutions, such as starting the analysis later than the start date of
the observed period, as LaLonde and Cho (2008) do. Therefore we repeat the fixed-
effects estimations for offenders incarcerated in 2005–08. In choosing this sub-sample,
we utilize the information available on recidivism: 80% of those who returned to prison
within our seven-year window of observation did so within three years, and more than
95% returned within five years. Therefore, we can be confident that the great majority
of those incarcerated in 2005–08 had not been in prison before 2002.
3.4 Estimates for recidivists
As discussed previously, we expect differences in the post-release behavior of one-time
offenders and of recidivists. To assess how this difference affects labor market out-
comes, we estimate equation (3).
yit ¼ αXit þ δZi þ β0⋅prisonit þ β1⋅betweenit þ β2⋅afterit þ
X84
t¼2
γtT t þ ci þ uit ð3Þ
The model is estimated separately for recidivists and for offenders with a single
prison term in the period observed. In the equation, prison stands for the months in
custody, between denotes months between two prison spells, and after indicates months
after the last observed prison sentence. The reference category is the period before in-
carceration. The between dummy is obviously omitted for non-recidivists. The equa-
tions are estimated with fixed effects.8
We anticipate that the β2 coefficients will be similar for the two groups under exam-
ination. For recidivists, the β1 coefficients are expected to indicate a significant negative
impact on employment and a weak effect on wages, as they capture the outcomes in a
period when the stigma effect is present but the ‘reform effect’ is absent.
4 Results
Raw data on the paths of employment and wages and estimates of the β coefficients of
equation (1) are shown in the six panels of Fig. 1. We observe a gradual erosion of em-
ployment as offenders approach the quarter of incarceration. This process, which has
been observed in all studies using similar data, is explained by several reasons. First,
Fig. 1 Employment and wages in quarters before/after incarceration. Sample: offenders with a single prison
spell in 2002–08, age >22. Quarter 0 stands for all quarters that included prison. Reference: five or more
quarters before the first prison quarter. The shaded areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering by persons
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paid work) rises as we move toward the date of incarceration. Second, many offenders lose
their jobs in the period of investigation and trial–especially as a trial takes place in the re-
gion where the crime was committed, often far from the offender’s permanent place of
abode and work. Third, many employers will sack a worker if they are informed of the
worker’s involvement in the judicial process. Workers who try to hide this might be
dismissed for unexplained absenteeism, while others quit voluntarily in order to keep
their involvement secret.
We also observe attrition in daily earnings, from about 80 to 70% of the national
average. Deductions for absenteeism and lower earnings from self-employment and
payment-by-result schemes might play a role in this. Furthermore, white-collar of-
fenders are most probably exposed to longer investigation and trials than are street-
corner dealers and thieves, and they face a greater risk of being fired if their employer
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ually biased toward unskilled workers as the time of incarceration approaches.
The path of employment is nearly symmetrical: employment starts to grow from vir-
tually zero to 18% by the end of the first post-prison year and exceeds 20% from the
second year onwards–levels that correspond to the pre-prison levels at a similar dis-
tance from the spell in prison. This is not the case with daily wages, which fall substan-
tially and stay below their pre-prison level throughout the period under observation.
The estimates of equation (1) reinforce the impressions gained from the raw data. In
the first year after release, employment falls short of the reference value. It then starts
to grow and significantly exceeds the reference level from the fifth full post-prison
quarter onwards. By contrast, wages drop significantly below the reference level for at
least 12 quarters, as suggested by the 95% confidence intervals shown in the middle
panels of Fig. 1.9 The conclusions remain if we narrow the window of observation to
|q| < 11 (bottom panels).
The fixed-effects estimates (Equation 2) are summarized in Table 2, while the detailed re-
sults, including test statistics, are presented in Appendix. The tests of random versus fixed-
effects models suggest that the latter are preferable to the former. The Hausman tests
resulted in high positive chi-squared values but were based on covariance matrices that
failed to meet the requirement of being positive semidefinite. Therefore, we apply instead
the Sargan–Hansen over-identification test proposed in Schaffer and Stillman (2010).
The estimates reinforce the impression that the path of employment is symmetrical:
1–8 quarters after release, the employment rate stands where it stood 1–8 quarters
prior to incarceration, and in the longer run it returns to the level observed more than
two years before imprisonment. By contrast, daily earnings are estimated to fall by 8–10
percentage points relative to the immediate pre-prison period and to stay at that level later.Table 2 Fixed-effects estimates of changes in employment and daily earningsa
Employmentb Daily earnings
uncontrolledc
Daily earnings
controlledd
Entire
sample
Incarcerated
after 2004
Entire
sample
Incarcerated
after 2004
Entire
sample
Incarcerated
after 2004
Quarters −8 to −1 −0.047*** −0.037*** −0.044*** −0.037*** −0.042*** −0.035***
(13.6) (9.5) (3.7) (2.8) (3.6) (2.7)
Prison quarters −0.182*** −0.177*** −0.238*** −0.263*** −0.230*** −0.254***
(44.1) (32.8) (10.9) (9.5) (10.8) (9.4)
Quarters 1 to 8 −0.046*** −0.034*** −0.134*** −0.129*** −0.122*** −0.118***
(8.3) (5.3) (6.4) (5.0) (6.0) (4.7)
Quarters 9 to 28 −0.005 0.004 −0.125*** −0.114*** −0.113*** −0.105***
(0.8) (0.5) (5.0) (3.5) (4.6) (3.3)
Reference values:
Mean 17.7 17.9 73.6 73.6 73.6 73.6
Standard dev. (37.8) (37.9) (61.1) (61.0) (61.1) (61.0)
Significant at the *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 level; t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by persons
The data relate to inmates serving a single prison spell in 2002–08 or 2005–08
aReference period for relative time: quarters −28 to −9
bDays in work during the month. Controlled for age, age squared and calendar months
cControlled for age, age squared and calendar months
dAlso controlled for occupation and type of employment relationship
For further test statistics, see Appendix
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less than they did two years (or more) prior to incarceration.
The estimates for the whole sample and for those imprisoned after 2004 are similar.
The results for wages controlled for occupation and type of employment relationship
differ only slightly, suggesting that the bulk of the wage loss comes from wage disad-
vantages within broad occupational categories.
Finally, we turn to the comparison of recidivists and non-recidivists. Two remarks
are in order before we look at the estimates. First, since the evaluation periods (before,
between, after) are wide enough, we can continue to estimate fixed-effects models with-
out worrying that calendar time and relative time are very closely correlated. The speci-
fication tests suggest that the fixed-effects models are preferable to the random-effects
ones. Second, in this model we want to test how accepted wage offers differ, depending
on whether the convicts continue to commit crimes or at least some of them stop.
Lower reservation wages may manifest themselves in lower accepted wages within oc-
cupations and/or increased propensity to accept job offers in low-wage occupations
and sectors. Since we are interested in the outcome rather than in how it comes about,
we do not control for job characteristics in the wage equations.
The results, summarized in Table 3, are consistent with expectations. The employ-
ment rate of recidivists falls significantly between two prison spells–by 3.4 percentage
points, equivalent to a 40% decline relative to the pre-prison level. At the same time,
we observe a minor and statistically insignificant fall in earnings between two prison
spells. By contrast, when the recidivists are released from their last observed prison
spell, and at least some of them withdraw from crime, their estimates do not differ
from those of non-recidivists: the relative wages of both groups fall by 9–10 percentage
points, and their employment rates do not differ (or do so only slightly) from their pre-
prison reference values.
The scope for checking the robustness of the results is limited by the availability of
alternatives to the data used in the preceding section. Table 4 collects estimates of the
employment and wage effects for different sample designs. In all cases, we estimate
fixed-effects equations with dummies for the prison and post-prison periods, treating
pre-prison months as a reference and controlling for calendar months. The tableTable 3 Estimates for convicts with one versus several prison spells in 2002–08. Fixed-effects estimates
of equation (3)
Employment Daily earnings
Recidivists between two prison spells −0.034*** −0.048
(8.64) (1.41)
Recidivists after their last prison spell −0.000 −0.096**
(0.10) (2.02)
Non-recidivists after their single prison spell −0.009** −0.089***
(2.47) (5.00)
Reference values for recidivists (pre-prison period):
Mean (%) 8.0 66.1
Standard deviation (26.6) (46.3)
Significant at the *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 level; t-values in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by persons
The coefficients show the level of employment/wages in the indicated periods relative to the pre-prison period
For further test statistics, see Appendix
Table 4 Fixed-effects estimates for selected sub-samples of non-recidivists
Sample variants Employment Daily earnings
Both gendersa −0.004 −0.080***
(1.06) (5.55)
Only mena −0.004 −0.086***
(1.04) (4.83)
Persons aged 16–22 inclusive 0.002 −0.067***
(0.44) (4.29)
Only persons older than 22 in 2002 −0.004 −0.077***
(0.91) (4.35)
Aged 22–35 0.003 −0.067***
(0.51) (2.96)
Older than 35 −0.008 −0.134***
(1.59) (4.51)
Inmates serving 1–3 months in prisona −0.012* −0.080**
(1.76) (2.21)
Inmates serving 1–6 months in prisona −0.012** −0.086***
(2.13) (2.68)
Inmates serving more than 3 months in prisona −0.008 −0.078***
(1.56) (3.17)
Inmates serving more than 6 months in prisona −0.007 −0.064***
(1.10) (2.89)
The coefficients relate post-prison employment and daily earnings to their pre-prison values; t-values in brackets.
Significant at the *0.1, **0.05 and ***0.01 level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by persons
aThe estimates relate to persons older than 22
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Unsurprisingly, the results for men and for the entire sample are practically identical.
Including young offenders or restricting the sample to persons older than 22 in 2002
makes no difference to the estimated employment effects, but the wage effect is slightly
weaker if we include young people. This is consistent with the observation that older
ex-convicts lose significantly more in terms of wages than do their younger counter-
parts: −13.4 percentage points compared to −6.7 percentage points.
The length of incarceration has a weak impact: inmates serving a short spell lose
marginally more in terms of employment and less in terms of wages. The similarity of
the results for short and long spells is all the more important, as these contain different
mixtures by type of custody: the share of inmates in pre-trial detention is presumably
high in the case of short, completed spells, whereas those people serving more than
3 months must be predominantly convicted prisoners.
5 Job search and alternative sources of income
The majority of released prisoners stop committing crimes and look for some alter-
native livelihood. About 80% of those released in 2002–03 did not return to prison
before December 2008–i.e., they spent 6–7 years without being incarcerated again.
(The ratios are probably similar for people released later, but our time window is too
narrow to observe them in the long run.) These people are unlikely to be imprisoned
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down a job. Despite that, the employment rate of the ex-prisoners does not exceed
its pre-prison level. Therefore, we expect the average ex-prisoner to make increased
efforts to seek alternative sources of income and assistance in their job search.
Table 5 shows logistic panel regression estimates of the probabilities of (i) registration
at the labor office, (ii) receipt of UI or UA, and (iii) receipt of other transfers, condi-
tional on being non-employed. The data relate to 2004–08. The models have been esti-
mated with random effects because prior employment experience and gender are
strong individual-specific predictors, which would drop out of a fixed-effects model.Table 5 Registration at a labor office and transfer receipt – odds ratios. Random-effects panel logit
estimates for months out of employment in 2004–08
Dependent variable: Registration at a labor office UI or UA Other transfersa
0–8 quarters before incarceration 0.97 0.90 0.71**
(0.4) (1.0) (2.0)
Prison quarters 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.12**
(15.4) (11.4) (9.8)
0–8 quarters after release 1.96*** 1.66*** 0.32***
(5.4) (2.6) (4.8)
9–28 quarters after release 2.14*** 2.91*** 0.61*
(5.7) (5.3) (1.8)
Male 0.95 1.23** 0.16***
(0.6) (2.6) (3.7)
Age 1.20*** 1.62*** 0.70***
(5.2) (9.6) (4.9)
Age squared 0.99*** 0.99*** 101***
(6.8) (10.2) (5.8)
Employed prior to incarcerationb 3.35*** 6.24*** 0.34***
(12.0) (11.0) (5.0)
2005 1.14*** 1.21*** 1.53***
(4.1) (4.18) (6.5)
2006 1.18*** 1.75*** 2.12***
(3.6) (8.9) (6.5)
2007 1.36*** 3.31*** 1.88***
(5.5) (15.7) (4.0)
2008 1.70*** 4.26*** 1.63**
(8.5) (17.4) (2.4)
Number of person-months 981,229 981,229 981,229
Number of persons 20,476 20,476 20,476
Wald chi-squared 25373.8 23157.6 13059.3
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rho (standard error) 0.83 (0.003) 0.89 (0.003) 0.98 (0.003)
Mean of the dependent variable (%) 14.7 8.4 10.8
Z-values in brackets. Significant at the *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01 level. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by persons. The
estimates relate to 2004–08 and cover inmates with a single spell in prison. Reference categories: female, non-employed
throughout the period prior to incarceration, 9th to 19th quarters prior to incarceration, 2004
aPension, disability pension, childcare allowance, social benefits, compensation for disabled family members,
compensation for widows and orphans
bEmployed at least once
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benefits receipt in 2004–08. The table shows odds ratios and z-values adjusted for the
clustering of observations by persons.
The results suggest a nearly twofold increase in the odds of being registered in the
first two years after release, and a further rise to 2.14 later. Similarly, the odds of receiv-
ing either UI or UA jump to 1.66 in the immediate post-prison period and to 2.91 in
the longer run. By contrast, the chances of receiving other transfers, less closely related
to unemployed status, fall significantly even before incarceration and stay at a low level
throughout the post-prison period.
In order to see how the magnitudes compare to those in the general population, we
compare the data of offenders to similar data for unskilled males observed in the
Labor Force Survey (LFS). In 2005, 17.2% of non-employed ex-prisoners were regis-
tered, which had grown to 20.3% by 2008. These rates are somewhat lower than
those measured among unskilled prime-age men in the general population: 21.3% in
2005 and 25.9% in 2008.10
Benefits and other transfers raised the proportion of ex-inmates earning some legit-
imate income (wage or benefit) to 35.2% in 2005 and 42.5% in 2008. A comparison with
LFS data is possible after excluding transfers other than UI, UA, pensions, and child-
care benefits. The rates of transfer receipt defined in this way (31% in 2005 and 37.6%
in 2008) are much lower than those measured in the comparable general population, in
which 85% earned a wage or received a transfer in 2005, and 91.3% in 2008. Of the
non-employed, 68% had income from transfers in 2005 (73.8% in 2008), as opposed to
only 15% of ex-inmates.
6 A note on post-prison jobs
The difficulties of re-employment partly stem from the rigor of Hungarian clean-
sheet regulations, which exclude ex-convicts from public-sector jobs and leading po-
sitions in micro-firms and self-proprietorships for a minimum of three years.11 As
the upper right panel of Fig. 2 shows, the 7% pre-prison share of public-sector jobs
falls to 2%, and the share of self-employment drops from a range of 10–15% to only
2–3%, in the first three post-prison years. (The non-zero rates after release are prob-
ably explained by cases when the arrestee was set free from pre-trial detention with-
out being sentenced to prison.) These figures compare to an 11% share of public-
sector jobs and a 7.6% share of self-employment among unskilled prime-age males
(14.6% and 13.6% among prime-age males with vocational qualifications), according
to the 2005 Q1 wave of the Labor Force Survey. The share of registered casual
workers within total legitimate employment increases substantially, but is of mar-
ginal importance (about 2% share) even at its peak.12
7 Discussion and implications for policy
The most important piece of information we have learned from the data is the low level
of legitimate employment of Hungarian prisoners both before and after incarceration.
In the period under investigation, their legitimate employment rate amounted to 17%
on average (when out of custody), a level substantially lower than that observed in the
US literature: Pettit and Lyons (2009) report that the ex-inmates studied by them spent
26% of their time in UI-covered jobs; LaLonde and Cho (2008) find a 30% post-prison
Fig. 2 Jobs before and after incarceration. (percent, all employed persons = 100). Notes. People with unknown
(0.7%) or unspecified (1.1%) types of contract and those with several types of contracts (1.4%) are included in total
employment but not shown separately. While employees are covered by the Labor Code, public employees
(közalkalmazott) and public servants (köztisztviselő) are subject to special regulations. The self-employed are owners
of own business, members of business partnerships and assisting family members. Registered casual workers
are employed with ‘casual work booklet’ allowing simplified administration and reduced contribution
payment for a limited period
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soned mothers in the US; Geller et al. (2006) studied predominantly young males and
reported a 41% level of legitimate employment in the first year after release. Our esti-
mate, by contrast, is 14.4% for the same period. Skardhamar and Telle (2009) report a
25% legitimate employment rate immediately after release in Norway. This compares to
10% for non-recidivists and 2% for recidivists in Hungary, in the first full quarter after
release.13
The employment gap would predictably be narrower but still rather wide if we took
informal employment into consideration. In a small-sample survey, Csáki and Mészáros
(2011) find that about 40% of the jobs held by future convicts are unregistered in
Hungary.14 Taking this information at face value, we can estimate the offenders’ total
employment rate at about 30%. Supposing that half of the jobs held by ex-offenders are
informal, we still end up with a rate short of 40%. For the sake of comparison, one
might refer to studies by Grogger (1995; 1998), which incorporate off-book employ-
ment using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (US). The 1995 paper
observed a 54% total employment rate, while the later paper reported that only 5.5% of
young men with criminal income in 1979 were non-employed throughout the year, and
the average person spent 1500 h in work during the year. In our sample, 45% had
no legitimate job at all in a period of seven years. The average person spent a max-
imum of 488 h in legitimate work annually (calculated as days in work, multiplied by
eight hours a day). Even if we assume equal shares of formal and informal jobs, the
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continue to fall short of 1000 h per annum.
Turning to the results on how incarceration affects labor market outcomes, we found
that the employment rate of the Hungarian ex-prisoners rises from near zero levels at
the moment of release to a range of 20–25%. This result (i.e., the recovery of legitimate
employment rate in the longer run) compares favorably to most of the findings based
on US administrative data. Waldfogel (1994) Grogger (1995) and Geller et al. (2006)
identify employment losses between 3 and 9%, depending on the samples under scru-
tiny and model specifications. While Pettit and Lyons (2009) and Lalonde and Cho
(2008) find an initial rise in the employment rate, this is followed by a process of attri-
tion, which drives the employment rate back to, or below, its pre-prison level. Similarly,
the data of Jung (2011) suggests that an initial rise of the employment rate is followed
by a decline: employment is lower by 8 percentage points 9 to 33 quarters after release
than it was 9 to 18 quarters before incarceration.
Data on total (formal plus informal) employment would most probably indicate zero
or even a positive prison effect for non-recidivists, and would not change our qualita-
tive conclusions. The share of informal employment within total employment is most
probably higher after incarceration than before, given the administrative constraints on
entering formal employment without a clean record and the existence of statistical dis-
crimination (for which we have ample anecdotal evidence).
The employment rate’s tendency to return to its modest pre-incarceration level might
give the impression that prisoners face similarly hard constraints to reintegration before
and after prison. But this impression is patently false. The post-release labor market ex-
perience of the prison population is strongly affected by the behavior of those convicts
who give up criminal activity as a source of livelihood and are ready to accept low-paid
jobs. Consistent with this expectation, we find that the earnings of released prisoners
fall substantially, and fall more for those who do not return to prison. The results for
recidivists confirm that, in the absence of a ‘reform’ effect, employment falls and wages
do not decline as much as they do for last-case offenders. Furthermore, we observe
signs of increased effort to find a legitimate source of livelihood on the part of the latter
group.15
At least three observations suggest that the existing practices and regulations do not
help the ex-convicts effectively.
First, in contrast to the findings of several papers in the US that show the highest
post-prison employment rates immediately after release, we find that less than 5% of
Hungarians leaving prison secure a job in the first full month after release, and 10%
have a job in the first full quarter after release. This pattern casts doubt on whether
post-release supervision and assistance are effective.
Second, the unconditional exclusion of ex-convicts from public sector jobs is a ques-
tionable policy, implying that people convicted of stealing a few bottles of perfume or
of evading taxes cannot be hired as cleaners, janitors, or drivers in public institutions.
Third, the ‘clean sheets’ issued by the authorities are rather laconic: they simply in-
form a would-be employer of the absence or presence of a criminal record, without in-
dicating the type of crime committed or the severity of the punishment. Under these
regulations, employers may find themselves basing their hiring decisions on a very poor
set of information, and this understandably makes them cautious. Arguably, employer
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discrimination.
Endnotes
1In one of their model variants, Pettit and Lyons (2009) match inmates and non-
inmates using a particularly rich set of administrative data that provides information on
criminal records, pre-prison careers, and even General Educational Development
(GED) test scores. Even so, they report significant differences in the two groups’ labor
market experience prior to the inmates’ incarceration, hinting at permanent productiv-
ity differentials.
2An often-cited exception is Kling (2006), who uses information on judges’ usual
stiffness of sentencing as an instrument to gauge the convict’s sentence. That paper
finds that the length of the prison term has no impact on employment and wages.
3In Europe in 2010, according to Walmsley (2010), the prison population per 100,000
inhabitants varied from 59 in Finland to 164 in Serbia–excluding two outliers (206 in
Jersey and 227 in Montenegro) and the former Soviet republics (254 in Estonia, 276 in
Lithuania and 314 in Latvia). In Hungary, it declined from more than 200 in 1987 to less
than 120 in 1990, due to amnesties in 1988, 1989 and 1990. Since then, the incarceration
rate has been following a rising trend, and it reached 180 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013
(see CSO 2013 for 1990–2013 and Eurostat 2014 for 1987–89.) The capacity of prisons
has not grown proportionally. According to a Helsinki Watch report (Helsinki,
2013) capacity utilization grew from an already high rate of 118 persons per 100
places in 2008 to 140 in 2012. In 2011, prison overcrowding was the second worst
in Europe, after Italy (Csóti, 2011).
4We have significantly more left-censored than right-censored spells for two reasons.
First, the left-censored spells include long sentences, while the right-censored spells can-
not be longer than 83 months (given our 84-month window of observation). Second,
many of the left-censored spells may belong to recidivists, while those serving more than
one prison spell in 2002–08 are treated separately from those serving only one term.
5The employment equations in the paper are controlled for gender, age, and age
squared. The wage equations are controlled for gender, age, age squared, occupational
status, type of employment relationship, and a dummy for employment spells lasting
for only one day. These spells account for only 0.8% of the total, but are associated with
exceedingly high earnings. This phenomenon is most probably explained by regulations
in some branches of the public sector, which do not allow payments for contract work
unless the subcontractor is formally ‘hired’ as an employee.
6We also broaden the brackets for relative time by using quarter rather than month
dummies, similar to LaLonde and Cho, who apply relative time dummies for six-month
periods in their quarterly panel.
7In Czafit and Köllő (2014) we show that, apart from a negligible number of outliers,
the cohort-specific levels fall very close to the full-sample means.
8In this case we cannot break down the pre- and post-prison periods by distance
from the date of incarceration and release, since relative time cannot be clearly defined
for recidivists.
9Estimates of the control variables of equation (1) are shown in Appendix.
Czafit and Köllő IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2015) 4:21 Page 17 of 2110Authors’ calculation using the 2005 Q1 and 2008 Q1 waves of the LFS. The data relate
to non-employed men aged 22–62 with primary or uncertified vocational education.
11Internet forums joined by ex-prisoners often mention cases where clean sheets are
also required by private employers, despite the fact that they cannot be sued for ‘negli-
gent hiring’, as is the case in several US states. See http://www.jogiforum.hu/forum/21/
9835, for instance.
12Registered casual workers are employed with a so-called ‘casual work booklet’, which
allows for simplified administration and reduced advance social security contribution pay-
ments for a limited period of time. At the same time, this form of employment provides
legitimate earnings and accrual points.
13The unemployment statistics yield similar worrisome results. The registered un-
employment rate of ex-prisoners amounted to 42.1% in 2005, the midpoint of our
period of observation, more than twice as high as in the comparable general popula-
tions: 19.5% among prime-age men with only a primary education and 6.5% among
those with a vocational qualification. Authors’ calculation using microdata from the
2005 Q1 wave of the LFS.
14Estimates for the general population range between 15 and 20% (Benedek et al.
2013: 164–167).
15The US results on wage changes are perplexingly mixed. Waldfogel (1994), Grogger
(1995), Needles (1996) and Geller et al. (2006) find a two-digit decline in wages, while
Pettit and Lyons (2009) identify a much smaller loss. At the same time, Lalonde and
Cho (2008) detect a minor gain, and Jung (2011) finds a substantial increase in real
earnings when working. Kling (2006) reports no effect of incarceration length.
AppendixTable 6 Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample (percent except if otherwise indicated)
Non-recidivists Recidivists
Male 91.2 94.0
Age in 2002 (year) 36.9 (9.9) 35.5 (8.9)
Number of prison spells in 2002–08 1 2.1 (0.8)
Average duration of completed prison spells, months (standard deviation) 12.8 (13.2) 12.9 (11.9)
Employed at least once in 2002–08 61.6 40.5
Employed on the 15th day of the month 2002–08 18.2 7.4
Days in work/potential days in work 2002–08 (standard deviation) 17.3 (37.3) 6.7 (24.5)
Days in work/potential days in work when employed 95.4 91.9
Employed for one day during the month 0.8 2.5
Average completed duration of employment spells, months (standard deviation) 8.2 (13.7) 5.0 (8.8)
Completed employment spells shorter than:
- 1 month 23.1 29.3
- 3 months 48.2 58.7
- 6 months 65.1 75.9
- 1 year 81.0 89.1
Occupational status when employed
- elementary 45.5 54.0
- middling 39.4 34.6
Table 6 Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample (percent except if otherwise indicated)
(Continued)
- professional 7.7 4.4
- unknown 7.2 7.0
Employment relationship
- Employee 86.2 89.4
- Public employee, civil servant 3.6 2.4
- Self-employed 6.8 4.2
- Registered casual worker 1.3 2.4
- Other 0.7 0.8
- Mixed (more than one type at a time) 1.4 0.8
Monthly earnings/national average (standard deviation) 63.1 (43.3) 53.9 (32.6)
Daily earnings/national average (standard deviation) 67.1 (58.2) 60.0 (45.1)
Received transfer when non-employed
- Unemployment insurance benefit 8.9 5.2
- Pension, disability pension 4.1 1.8
- Other transfer 6.4 1.4
- Several transfers at a time 0.9 0.2
- None of the above transfers 79.7 91.5
Registered at a labor office when non-employed 14.5 10.3
Elementary: cleaners, material handlers, porters and guards, other unskilled manual, machine operators, drivers.
Professionals: managers, teachers, doctors, other professionals, professional military personnel. Middling: all
other occupations
Table 7 Effects of the control variables in equation (1)
Employment Daily earnings
Male 0.044*** 0.060***
(7.73) (4.61)
Age 0.018*** 0.013***
(11.27) (3.12)
Age squared/100 −0.025*** −0.017***
(12.92) (3.02)
Job characteristics
Elementary - −0.061***
(7.39)
Professional - 0.102***
(4.12)
Unknown or missing - −0.077**
(2.45)
Employment relationship
Public servant, public employee - 0.305***
(10.31)
Self-employed - −0.126***
(4.46)
Employed with ‘casual work booklet’ - −0.366***
(3.95)
Other - −0.114*
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Table 7 Effects of the control variables in equation (1) (Continued)
(1.96)
Multiple job holder - 0.242***
(4.45)
Employed for one day during the month - 0.836***
(5.65)
Constant −0.125 0.460
Number of observations 1,361,558 197,382
Number of persons 19,815 10,746
R-squared within 0.056 0.033
R-squared between 0.003 0.053
R-squared overall 0.045 0.065
Wald chi2 (118) 6224.63 1304.19
(0.000) (0.000)
Random-effects panel regression. Reference categories: non-elementary, non-professional job (for job characteristics) and
employee (for the employment relationship). Dependent variables: ‘employment’ stands for days in work during the
month, as a fraction of potential days. ‘Daily earnings’ stand for all recorded income during the month divided by the
number of days in work. Normalized for the national average in the given month
Table 8 Coefficient estimates and test statistics for equation (2)
Employment Daily earnings (controlled)
Random effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects
Estimates for the entire sample
Quarters −8 to −1 −0.047 −0.047 −0.035 −0.042
(13.9) (13.6) (3.3) (3.6)
Prison quarters −0.179 −0.182 −0.212 −0.230
(41.8) (44.1) (12.8) (10.8)
Quarters 1–8 −0.048 −0.046 −0.105 −0.122
(8.68) (8.3) (7.6) (6.0)
Quarters 9–28 −0.001 −0.005 −0.090 −0.113
(0.8) (0.8) (5.7) (4.6)
No. of observations 1,361,558 1,361,558 197,382 197,382
No. of groups 19,815 19,815 10,746 10,746
Observations per group 68.7 68.7 18.4 18.4
R2 within 0.052 0.052 0.020 0.019
R2 between 0.001 0.000 0.067 0.040
R2 overall 0.042 0.033 0.057 0.041
Wald chi2 6017.1 - 1316.9 -
Prob > chi2 (0.0000) - (0.0000) -
F-test - 66.6 - 10.91
Prob > F - (0.0000) - (0.0000)
Corr (u_i, Xb) - −0.076 - −0.057
Sargan–Hansen 1022.1 (0.0000) 288.1 (0.0000)
Estimates for inmates incarcerated in 2005–08
Quarters −8 to −1 −0.038 −0.037 −0.032 −0.035
(9.9) (9.5) (2.5) (2.7)
Prison quarters −0.175 −0.177 −0.229 −0.254
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Table 8 Coefficient estimates and test statistics for equation (2) (Continued)
(34.0) (32.8) (10.5) (9.4)
Quarters 1–8 −0.035 −0.034 −0.103 −0.118
(5.8) (5.3) (6.4) (4.7)
Quarters 9–28 0.002 0.004 −0.087 −0.105
(0.3) (0.5) (4.6) (3.3)
No. of observations 832,204 832,204 125,409 125,409
No. of groups 12,182 12,182 6557 6557
Observations per group 68.3 68.3 19.1 19.1
R2 within 0.049 0.050 0.020 0.020
R2 between 0.002 0.003 0.065 0.038
R2 overall 0.042 0.041 0.064 0.045
Wald chi2 3547.5 - 887.7 -
Prob > chi2 (0.0000) - (0.0000) -
F-test - 39.5 - 7.65
Prob > F - (0.0000) - (0.0000)
Corr (u_i, Xb) - −0.070 - 0.012
Sargan–Hansen 2075.7 (0.0000) 241.8 (0.0000)
Table 9 Estimates for convicts with one versus several prison spells in 2002–08. Sargan_Hansen
tests for equation (3)
Employment Daily earnings
Recidivists between two prison spells 462.353 125.945
Recidivists after their last prison spell (0.0000) (0.0050)
Non-recidivists after their single prison spell 796.131 357.188
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Other test statistics: Employment equation for recidivists and non-recidivists: corr(ui, Xb) = −0.165 and −0.081, rho = 0.304
and 0.511. Wage equation: corr(ui, Xb) = −0.392 and −0.148, rho = 0.423 and 0.408
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